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I. INTRODUCTION
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), a severe respiratory
illness, is caused by a previously unknown coronavirus (SARS-Cov).1 As
of this writing, the disease has no vaccine and no cure.2 In general, the
disease starts with a high fever, accompanied by headaches, body aches,
and mild respiratory symptoms. Most patients develop pneumonia, and
some cases require mechanical ventilation. SARS spreads through
respiratory droplets produced by an infected person when he or she coughs
or sneezes or through physical contact. Thus, a person is vulnerable to the
disease when engaging in a close person-to-person contact, such as kissing
or embracing, and sharing eating or drinking utensils. Talking with a
SARS patient within three feet can also be dangerous.3 According to Dr.
Heymann, of the World Health Organization (WHO), “SARS is the first
severe and easily transmissible new disease to emerge in the 21st
century.”4
The disease was first identified in a southern province of China on
November 16, 2002.5 It quickly spread to twenty-seven countries.6 In
March of 2003, the WHO declared SARS a global health threat.7 During
the 2003 outbreak, 8,096 people worldwide were infected with SARS, 774
1. Ctr. Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Serv. (CDC), Frequently
Asked Questions About SARS, at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/faq.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. SARS: Assessment, Outlook, and Lessons Learned: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Subcom. on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. 8 (2003) (statement of
David L. Heymann, Exec. Director for Communicable Diseases, World Health Organization).
5. WHO, Summary Table of SARS Cases by Country, at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/
en/country2003_08_15.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
6. WHO, Summary of Probable SARS Cases, at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/
table2003_09_23/en (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
7. WHO, World Health Organization Issues Emergency Travel Advisory (Mar. 15, 2003), at
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/archive/2003_03_15/en (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
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of whom fell victim to the disease.8 In China, the economic and social
costs of the outbreak were enormous. 5,327 people were infected with
SARS in China by June of 2003. 329 died as a result of these infections.9
The direct economic loss of the outbreak over three months was
approximately $18 billion.10 In addition, the public lost an inordinate
amount of confidence in the Chinese health care system.
Quarantine and isolation are the most effective means to control
SARS.11 Cutting infection rates required the governments in affected
regions to react quickly to initial cases, take action to restrict infection in
the region, and publicly announce the outbreak to neighboring regions and
the international community.12
In the 2003 outbreak, the global effort to combat the SARS epidemic
hinged on how effectively China dealt with the crisis. After investigating
the SARS situation in Guangdong, the WHO expert team concluded that
there would be no chance of controlling the epidemic in other countries
unless it was first contained in China.13 Unfortunately, initial information
about the outbreak in China was concealed for fear of damaging local
image and trade. As a result, the epidemic quickly gained momentum and
erupted into a national health threat. After the SARS epidemic devastated
Beijing in April of 2003, the Chinese government began a transparent
approach and openly launched a national campaign against SARS. Newly
enacted SARS laws and regulations played a crucial role in establishing
the SARS reporting system, allocating medical resources, and
administering massive quarantine and isolation. The epidemic was brought
under control in June of 2003.
This Article examines the legal aspects of the Chinese government’s
reaction to the SARS epidemic between November 2002 and June of
2003. It begins by tracing the development of the SARS epidemic and
8. WHO, Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 Nov. 2002 to 31 Jul.
2003 (Dec. 31, 2003), at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en (last visited Nov.
13, 2004).
9. Id.
10. Sun Yuting, Zhongguo neidi jingji yin feidian sunshi 179 yi meiyuan [SARS Caused $17.9
Billion in Damages in Mainland China], ZHONGGUO QINGIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], Nov. 11,
2003, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-11-11/06122109319.shtml (last visited Sept. 6,
2004).
11. CDC, Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (Jan. 8, 2004), at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/D/
isolation.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
12. See generally WHO, SARS: Lessons from a New Disease, at http://www.who.int/
whr/2003/chapter5/en/print.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004) (describing the spread of SARS, reactions
to this spread and lessons learned as a result).
13. Assessment, Outlook, and Lessons Learned, supra note 4, at 13.
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examining the different reactions of the Chinese Government to the
outbreak before and after April 20, 2003. The Article further provides an
in-depth analysis of the new SARS laws and problems the government
encountered while enforcing them. While the Article contrasts the new
laws to the 1989 law on infectious diseases, it also discusses the striking
resemblances between the two. This Article concludes by arguing that
changing China’s traditional indifference toward existing laws would be
far more effective in preventing epidemics than its current approach of
enacting new laws for the same purpose.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SARS EPIDEMIC BEFORE APRIL 20, 2003
A. Starting from Guangdong14
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the first SARS
case was identified on November 16, 2002, in Guangdong Province,
China.15 The patient was treated in a local hospital where several medical
workers were infected with the same disease. It is unclear which hospital
admitted the patient, when he was released, or how many people had been
in close contact with the patient.16
Two months later, in response to an increase in the number of reported
SARS cases, the Health Department of Guangdong sent a task force on
January 21, 2003 to three local hospitals that admitted SARS patients.17
The taskforce produced an internal report that confirmed the outbreak of
SARS and detailed the symptoms of the disease. The report also provided
several rules on how hospitals should handle SARS cases. Unfortunately,
the internal report was not released to the public until February 11, 2003.18

14. The following two Parts were adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, CHINESE LAW
SARS Ch. 1 (2004). Guangdong is a southern province of China. Guangzhou is the provincial
capital of Guangdong. Guangdong is also pronounced “Canton,” as in “Cantonese.”
15. The WHO cited November 16, 2002 as the date of the onset of the first identified case in
Guangdong. See WHO, Summary Table of Areas that Experienced Local Transmission of SARS
During the Outbreak Period from 1 Nov. 2002 to 31 July 2003 (Nov. 21, 2003), at
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/areas/areas2003_11_21/en/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). Subsequently,
major news resources reporting on SARS, such as China Daily, People’s Daily, Asian Times, and
Washington Post, have cited November 16, 2003 as the date when SARS was identified.
16. Audra Ang, Early SARS Patient as Mysterious as Disease, MONTEREY HERALD, Apr. 12,
http://www.montereyherald.com/mld/mcherald/2003/04/13/news/world/5619257.htm
(last
2003,
visited Sept. 6, 2004).
17. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 2.
18. Id. GUANDONG SHENG WEISHENG TING FU ZHONGSHAN SHI HUIZHEN DIAOCHA ZHUANJIA ZU
[SPECIALIST INVESTIGATIVE CONSULTING GROUP SENT BY GUANDONG PROVINCE HEALTH
DEPARTMENT], SHENG ZHUANJIA ZU GUANYU ZHONGSHAN SHI BU MING YUANYIN FEIYAN DIAOCHA
BAOGAO [THE INVESTIGATION REPORT FOR THE UNKNOWN LUNG DISEASE IN ZHONGSHAN CITY],
ON
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Among the many SARS cases, the most notable was that of Mr. Zhou,
the “super spreader.”19 During his treatment at Zhongshan No. 2 hospital,
Mr. Zhou infected more than thirty people, including attending doctors,
nurses, and other health care personnel.20 Both the Deputy Chief Director
of the hospital and the ambulance driver who transferred Mr. Zhou to the
infectious disease hospital died of SARS.21 Mr. Zhou’s case was well
recorded by the local news, but was withheld from the public for several
weeks before being published.22
While local hospitals were overwhelmed by the highly contagious
disease, the public was kept in the dark. No public announcements or news
releases detailed the outbreak. Speculation soon began to circulate among
the uninformed public that a strange, incurable disease had rapidly
developed in Guangzhou.23 The public, lacking official guidance, panicked
in reaction to the outbreak. Local residents rushed to purchase Ban Lan
Gen (BLG, a Chinese herb medicine), antibiotics, white vinegar, and even
iodized salt, all of which were rumored to be effective against SARS.24
Cunning merchants took advantage of the opportunity and used the false
information to exploit the crisis.25
Under mounting public pressure, the government, on February 11,
2003, finally acknowledged that there had been 305 SARS cases and five
deaths in Guangdong.26 It authorized a local newspaper to release the
information to the public.27 Nearly three months transpired between the
Feb. 11, 2003, at http://club.emkt.com/cn/showflat.php?Cat=&Board=ad&Number=167158&page
=15&view=expanded&sb=1&o=0&fpart=1&vc=1 and http://club.emkt.com.cn/showflat.php?Cat
=&Board=ad&Number=167399&page=15&view=expanded&sb=1&o=0 (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
19. Feidian chaoji chuanbozhe jujue caifang duo fang renyuan beigan yihan [“Super Spreader”
Cancelled News Interview], DAHUA WANG [DAHUA NET], http://www.dahuawang.com/ztxw/feiyan/
6279.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2004). Mr. Zhou infected as many as 130 people with SARS. Id.
20. Liao Huailing, Bai ming bai yi tian shi mao si jiu yi ren [Hundreds of White Angels Risking
Lives to Save One], YANG CHENG WEN BO [GUANGZHOU EVENING NEWS], Feb. 15, 2003,
http://www.gd.xinhua.org/ztbd/2003-02/14/content_224152.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2004).
21. Wu Zigang, Renming wei Jiankang er zhan [People Fought for Health], XINHUA NEWS, Aug.
1, 2003, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1062/1996041.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). The
article provides a timeline of the outbreak in Guangdong and confirms that the health officials from
Heyuan, where the first cluster of cases was identified, filed a report with the provincial government
on Jan. 2, 2003.
22. Liao, supra note 20.
23. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 7.
24. QianLong, Fansi liangda shijian: Chuanmei he gongzhong ying ruhe goutong? [Revisit Two
Big Incidents: How did the Media Communicate with the Public?], QIANLONG.COM, Mar. 5, 2003,
http://medianet.21dnn.com/7631/2003-3-5/33@712793_3.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2004) [hereinafter
QianLong, Revisit].
25. Id.
26. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 7.
27. Id.
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first identified case and the initial public announcement of the outbreak.
By the time the government dealt publicly with the outbreak, SARS had
garnered significant momentum and was on its way to other regions.
B. From Guangdong to Hong Kong and the Rest of the World
When Guangzhou health officials admitted to the SARS outbreak in
February, they made it clear that the city was safe to live in and visit.28 As
a result, the public panic in the province received little attention in Hong
Kong, which is only 174 kilometers (108 miles) away.29 Any
communication between the regions about the outbreak might have
prevented its spread to Hong Kong. Unfortunately, no such
communication occurred, and the border between the two regions was not
monitored.30
While one cannot reconstruct the exact route by which the deadly virus
was transmitted to Hong Kong, Dr. Liu is widely believed to have set off
the SARS epidemic there.31 Dr. Liu was one of the physicians who treated
SARS patients, including Mr. Zhou, the “super spreader,” at Zhoushan No.
2 Hospital in Guangdong.32 On February 21, 2003, Dr. Liu travelled to
Hong Kong to attend a wedding.33 His arrival turned what was supposed to
be a happy beginning into a tragedy.
When Dr. Liu checked into the hotel, he already had a fever and a dry
cough, and experts believed that Dr. Liu left a trail of the deadly virus on
the ninth floor.34 At least sixteen people staying at the hotel were infected
with SARS the same day.35 Those people eventually carried the virus to
Vancouver, Toronto, Singapore and Hanoi. Dr. Liu was later admitted to
the Kwong Wah Hospital. Although he told doctors and nurses at the
28. Ho Shuwang, Huang ChuanJiang, Bingqing yi kongzhi, shimin wuxu konghuang [The
Disease is Under Control, so the Public Should Not Panic], YANGCHENG WANBAO [GUANGZHOU
EVENING NEWS], Feb. 11, 2003, http://news.sohu.com/48/00/news206290048.shtml (last visited Sept.
6, 2004) [hereinafter The Disease is Under Control]. This notice assured the public that there was no
need for concern about the disease; it was not as serious as was rumored.
29. Jan Wong, How China Failed the World, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 5, 2003, at F6
(discussing how the Chinese government failed to react to the spread of the deadly virus in the
beginning of the outbreak).
30. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 13.
31. Ellen Nakashima, SARS Signals Missed in Hong Kong; Physician's Visit May Have Led to
Most Known Cases, WASH. POST, May 20, 2003, at A1.
32. John Pomfret, In Chinese Village, Few Clues to Illness, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2003, at A17.
33. Nakashima, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. WHO, SARS: Lessons From a New Disease, at http://www.who.int/whr/2003/chapter5/en/
print.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Lessons from a New Disease].
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hospital that he was highly contagious and asked to be isolated, the doctors
did not heed his advice.36 By the time doctors placed Dr. Liu in isolation,
seventy hospital workers and seventeen students were infected.37 Dr. Liu
died of SARS on March 4, 2003.38 In the end, 1755 people in Hong Kong
were infected with SARS, of whom 299 died.39
C. Entering Beijing40
It was a bold step for the government of Guangdong, in the midst of
mounting domestic and international criticism, to reveal the SARS
outbreak. However, the epidemic at that point was far from controlled. The
government tried to downplay the seriousness of the outbreak in order to
rebuild Guangdong’s tarnished image and minimize damage to the local
economy.41 Most people outside Guangdong were convinced that the
disease was mild with a minute fatality rate. As a result, no preventive
measures were taken in Beijing and other Northern cities. Train travel
between Guangzhou, Hong Kong and other domestic cities remained
unrestricted.42
Ms. Xu reportedly spread the SARS epidemic to Shanxi Province and
the city of Beijing.43 On February 18, 2003, Ms. Xu began her business
trip to Guangzhou.44 While on her way back home to Shanxi, Ms. Xu
36. Wong, supra note 29.
37. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 13.
38. Id.
39. WHO, Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 Nov. 2002 to 31 July
2003, at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
40. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 15–19.
41. The Disease is Under Control, supra note 28.
42. Lai Hailong, Shei tuidao SARS duominnuo gupai? [Who Knocked Over the SARS Domino
Cards?], ZHONGGUO XIN WENSHE [CHINESE NEWS AGENCY], June 2, 2003, at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/19/20030603/1006910.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004);
Pomfret, supra note 32.
43. This account is based on the following sources: Xing Bao, Tale of a Superspreader,
SHANGHAI STAR, May 29, 2003, at http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2003/0529/pr24-1.html (last
visited Oct. 19, 2004); Beijing SARS Outbreak Cover up Claim, F2 NETWORK, Apr. 14, 2003, at
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/04/14/1050172524902.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2004); Liu
Chang, Huabei diyili shuruxing feidian huanzhe shouci gongkai geren jingli [The First Revelation of
her Personal Experience of the First Imported SARS Patient in Northern China], PEOPLE’S NET, May
22, 2003, at http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/212/10548/10648/20030522/998483.html (last
visited Sept. 6, 2004.); Erik Eckholm, Cases of Lethal New Illness Rise Sharply in Interior Region,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at A6; Lai Hailong, supra note 42; Pomfret, supra note 32; Miao Ye,
SARS Wreaks Havoc in Shanxi Province, ASIAN TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at http://www.atimes.com/
atimes/China/ED18Ad01.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004); How One Woman Set Off the Outbreak in
Beijing, THE STRAITS TIMES, May 31, 2003, at http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/sars/story/
0,4395,192042,00.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2004).
44. Liu Chang, supra note 43; Lai Hailong, supra note 42.
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began to have a fever and chills.45 She was admitted to a reputable hospital
in Taiyuan, the capital city of Shanxi Province.46 Doctors who treated Xu
were unaware of the SARS outbreak in Guangzhou because no
communication regarding the epidemic took place between Guangzhou
and other cities.47
On February 28, 2003, Ms. Xu was transferred to the 301 Military
Hospital in Beijing, one of the most highly regarded hospitals in China.
However, to Ms. Xu’s dismay, doctors at this elite hospital were no better
at diagnosing SARS than the local doctors in Shanxi.48 Ms. Xu was first
put in an observation ward where three patients were being treated for
other diseases.49 By the time a respiratory expert realized the unusual
nature of her illness and put Ms. Xu under quarantine, a number of health
workers and co-patients had been infected.50 Ms. Xu was later transferred
to the 302 Military Hospital for further treatment.51 During her transfer,
the accompanying doctors and nurses took no preventive measures.52 Ms.
Xu reportedly infected at least twelve health workers and patients in the
two military hospitals.53 Within two weeks, both of Ms. Xu’s parents
contracted SARS and died at the Beijing 302 Military Hospital.54 In
addition, Ms. Xu’s one-year-old son, her brother, and her brother-in-law
were all infected with the disease.55
Unfortunately, the virus did not stop at the military hospitals. SARS
cases were soon found in other hospitals in Beijing. At the No. 1 People’s
Hospital of Beijing University, ninety-three health workers were infected
with SARS. Due to the high cross-infection rate, the entire hospital was
sealed off for two weeks.56 A retired university professor, who had visited
the People’s Hospital, contracted the deadly virus and died a week later.57
The professor infected his family members, who subsequently set off the
45. Liu Chang, supra note 43.
46. Id.
47. Id.; Lai Hailong, supra note 42.
48. Liu Chang, supra note 43.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.; Lai Hailong, supra note 42.
53. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 17.
54. Id.; Beijing SARS Cover-up Claim, supra note 43.
55. Liu Chang, supra note 43.
56. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 68–69. Zhao Xiaojian, Ren ming yi yuan da gui mo gan ran
diao cha [An Investigation on the Large Scale Infection at the People’s Hospital], CAI JING
MAGAZINE, extra edition on SARS, May 16, 2003, at http://china.qianlong.com/4453/2003-520/43@850108.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
57. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 65.

2005]

REGULATING SARS IN CHINA

89

SARS epidemic in two adjacent universities.58 Several student dormitories
in the two universities were put under full quarantine for weeks.59 The
“dominoes” continued to fall. The SARS epidemic spread rapidly; by the
end of April, it took the entire city of Beijing hostage.
III. FIGHTING TO RELEASE SARS INFORMATION: AN UPHILL BATTLE60
April 20, 2003 was the turning point in the battle against SARS in
China. Prior to this date, the SARS epidemic was taboo in the Chinese
news media. Both the local government in Guangdong and the highest
health department in Beijing denied that SARS was a serious threat to
public health.61 Both assured the public that SARS was a regional
problem, confined to the southern part of China, and it was under control.
The words “epidemic” and “outbreak” rarely appeared in the media.62
After April 20 the Chinese government took a completely different
approach. Minister Zhang of the State Health Ministry and the Mayor of
Beijing were removed from office, the national media was full of SARS
reports, a daily SARS reporting system was established, and a national
campaign against SARS was officially and openly launched.63 In short, the
SARS outbreak was no longer a secret. However, winning the battle over
the release of the information was not easy.
58. Id. at 56–57.
59. Lou Yi, SARS xiji zhongcai beijiaoda diaocha [SARS Attacked Central Unviersity of Finance
and Economics and North Jiaotong University—A Report], CAI JING MAGAZINE, May 12, 2003, at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20030512/1651339387.shtml (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). See also
Zhongyang caijing daxue zhi shehui gejie de yifeng ganxiexin [CUFE’s Letter of Thanks to the
Public], REN MIN RI BAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], June 10, 2003, at 12, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/
kejiao/40/20030610/1013014.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2004).
60. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 21–32.
61. See Chen Yun, Weishengbuzhang wu shiwei dai biao: Yue feidianxing feiyan yi kongzhi [The
Minister of Health Meets WHO Representative: Atypical Pneumonia in Guangdong is Under Control],
RENMING WANG [PEOPLE’S NET], Mar. 19, 2003, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/47/
20030319/947458.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004); Song Liyun, Beijing shuruxing feidianxing feiyan
dedao youxiao kong zhi [The Imported Atypical Pneumonia in Beijing Is Under Control: Beijing is
Completely Capable of Dealing with the Epidemic], Mar. 27, 2003, at http://www.people.com.cn/
GB/kejiao/20030327/955101.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
62. Zhang Zili, “Feidian” Weiji yu jiankang chuanbo [SARS Crisis and Media Reports on
Health], MEDIA CHINA NET, at http://bbs.mediachina.net/index_bbs_cmrsd_view.jsp?id=563 (last
visited Sept. 9, 2004). Fudan University School of Journalism in Shanghai, the leading journalism
school in China, sponsors this website. Contributors include well-known professors, journalists and
graduate students.
63. Id.; Li Qing, Jiang Yanyong: Renmin liyi gaoyu yiqie [Jiang Yanyong: People’s Interests are
Above All], SHANLIAN SHENGHUO ZHOUKAN [SHANLIAN LIFE WEEK], June 11, 2003, at 1,
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/yuanqing/2003/06/200306110947.shtml (last visited Sept. 7,
2004); Nakashima, supra note 31.
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Shortly after the government of Guangdong made its first official
report about the SARS situation to the WHO on February 11, 2003, the
local Health Bureau held a news conference.64 During the conference,
health officials denied any wrongdoing in handling the SARS epidemic
information.65 When a reporter asked why it took nearly three months for
the government to release the information to the public, the Chief Director
of the Health Department of Guangdong responded that “three hundred
and five cases in Guangdong province were not too many, so it was not
necessary to make a public announcement about the SARS epidemic. The
only reason for releasing the information today is that the disease has
caused social panic.”66 Other health officials explained that the number of
SARS cases (over 100) represented only a tiny portion of the city’s
population of 10 million people.67 When a reporter asked whether Hong
Kong should restrict travel from Guangdong, the official replied that “no
such disease has been found in Hong Kong,”68 implying that no such steps
were necessary.
In an effort to defuse speculation that the number of SARS cases was
underreported, the Health Ministry of China held its first news conference
about SARS on April 3, 2003.69 News reporters from China and abroad
were invited to the conference. Mr. Zhang, the Minister of Health, assured
the public that SARS was under control, going so far as to tease a foreign
cameraman who was wearing a facemask at the conference, saying,
“China is safe to live in and travel to, . . . with or without a mask!”70 Mr.
Zhang’s calm demeanor and humorous disposition convinced the public
that SARS was not serious and would soon fade away.71 According to Mr.
Zhang, there were only twelve SARS cases and only three deaths in
Beijing.72 Minister Zhang’s message convinced not only to the public, but
64. Xiao Ping et al., Shiwen feidian xingfeiyian, sheng shi weishengbuman zuochu zhengmian
huiying [Ten Questions About the Atypical Pneumonia, Responses From the Health Departments of
the Province and Municipality], JINYANG NET, Feb. 12, 2003, at http://www.ycwb.com/gb/content/
2003-02/12/content_489180.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Ten Questions].
65. Id.
66. Id. See also Renming wei Jiankang, supra note 21.
67. Ten Questions, supra note 64.
68. Id.
69. Zhu Yu, Zhang Wenkang xiaoyian: “Zhongguo shi anquan de!” [“China is Safe!” said
Zhang Wenkang with Smiles], XINHUA NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, available at http://www1.people.com.cn/
GB/shizheng/3586/20030403/962519.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
70. Id.
71. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 24.
72. Id. at 24–25.
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also the WHO, which, after the news conference, took Beijing off its list
of SARS-affected areas.73
The national news media remained quiet about the SARS outbreak.
Journalism scholars later referred to the news media’s reaction to the
SARS outbreak as “collective speechlessness.”74 On April 5, 2003, a
month after Ms. Xu set off the outbreak in the two military hospitals,
nearly one-quarter of Beijing residents between the ages of eighteen and
sixty did not know what SARS was, much less how to take preventive
measures.75 Between February 10, 2003 and April 3, 2003, only two major
national news reports were published about SARS, both of which assured
that Guangzhou and Beijing were safe.76
Dr. Jiang, a seventy-two-year-old retired surgeon, finally broke the
silence about SARS.77 After his best friend contracted SARS at the 301
Military Hospital, he conducted a preliminary investigation and discovered
146 SARS cases in the three military hospitals alone; this was more than
ten times the figure Minister Zhang had released at the news conference.78
On April 4, 2003, Dr. Jiang wrote a letter to China Central Television
(CCTV-4) and to Phoenix, a Hong Kong-based television station.79 In his
letter, Dr. Jiang revealed that the SARS epidemic was far more serious
than Minister Zhang had suggested.80 In a separate letter, Dr. Jiang called
on the Minister to resign for covering up SARS information in Beijing.81
After the stations refused to publish the letters, Time Magazine released
Dr. Jiang’s findings on the Internet in Susan Jakes’s article, Beijing’s
SARS Attack.82
73. Wen Zhao, Kang feibeiwang Lv: Zhongyang zhengfu feichang mohe 70 tian [A Memorandum
on the Fight Against SARS: 70 Days’ Grinding Period for the New Central Government], published
originally in ZHONG HUA GONG SHANG SHI BAO [CHINA INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL TIMES],
May 29, 2003, http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/news/8410/20030529/1003196.html (last visited Aug.
2, 2004) [hereinafter 70 Days]. This article traces the development of SARS in Guangdong and how
the government initially dealt with the disease and the social panic. It then gives a timeline of the
Central Government’s efforts to combat SARS. The article criticizes the approach that the government
took in the early stages and praises the new government for its openness and effectiveness.
74. Yu Guoming, 2004 zhongguo chuanmei ye fazhan dashi tuixiang [News Media Development
Trends in 2004—Forecast], Apr. 29, 2004, ZHONGHUA CHUAN MEI WANG [CHINESE MEDIA NET], at
http://academic.mediachina.net/lw_view.jsp?id=887 (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
75. Zhang Zili, supra note 62.
76. Id.
77. Li Qing, supra note 63.
78. Id. According to this report, Dr. Jiang found that there were 46, 40 and 60 SARS cases in the
No. 301, 302 and 309 Military Hospitals, respectively.
79. Li Qing, supra note 63.
80. Susan Jakes, Beijing’s SARS Attack, TIME ASIA, Apr. 8, 2003, http://www.time.com/time/
asia/news/daily/0,9754,441615,00.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Whistle-blowers in China are rare and usually face extreme
government opposition. It took extraordinary courage for Dr. Jiang to
disclose this information to the media. Many doctors, experts, and health
officials were also aware of the severe situation in Beijing when Dr. Jiang
challenged the underreported figures.83 However, Dr. Jiang was the only
one who spoke out.84 In the Chinese political system, it is unwise to reveal
top-secret information to the foreign press. His act is even more heroic
considering that Dr. Jiang was a military doctor.85
Dr. Jiang’s letter played a crucial role in getting the information to the
domestic public as well as to the international community.86 The WHO
publicly criticized the Government of Beijing for its poor cooperation after
the actual facts regarding SARS in Beijing were released.87 During a
WHO press briefing, Dr. Heymann told reporters, “we have heard
conflicting reports from health workers, [and] what’s occurring in Beijing
is more serious than what the government has told us.”88 The WHO
subsequently added Beijing back to the list of the SARS affected areas.89
On April 20, Minister Zhang was removed from his post and a National
Campaign against SARS was launched.90 Dr. Jiang became an instant
hero.91

83. Dr. Jiang’s brave act was lauded by colleagues, officials and the public alike. Dr. Zhu
Chunwu, Dr. Jiang’s classmate from medical school told reporters,
The later development of SARS proved what Dr. Jiang did was right. Many people I know
believed that Dr. Jiang should be awarded with outstanding service. I know it was not the
honor that he was pursuing, but he is really a hero in the people’s minds. . . . Dr. Jiang did
what a doctor should have done. During the time when the information was blocked, there
could have been hundreds of people who had more accurate information than Dr. Jiang had,
but Dr. Jiang was the only one who bravely spoke out. I am an infectious disease doctor and I
should have been the one to speak out. However, I didn’t. I am afraid I could not do it in the
future. Dr. Jiang inspired all of us. I admire him.
Li Qing, supra note 63.
84. Id.
85. Jakes, supra note 80. Even though article 41 of the Constitution confers upon citizens the
right to file complaints and charges against any state institution for violations of law or dereliction of
duty, individuals rarely invoke this article. The Ministry of Health issued a notice in 1989 that clearly
prohibits individuals from releasing any epidemic information to the foreign media. Ministry of
Health, Notice Regarding Authorization on the Announcement of an Epidemic Situation, Nov. 8, 1989,
in CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 149.
86. Li Qing, supra note 63.
87. Press Briefing, WHO, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Apr. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/Press_2003_04_11/en/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
88. Id.
89. 70 Days, supra note 73.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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IV. NEW GOVERNMENT AND NEW APPROACH92
The SARS outbreak in Beijing coincided with the Tenth Plenary
Session of the National People’s Congress (Tenth NPC), held from March
5 to March 18, 2003, at which a new Chinese Central Government was
elected. At the time, it was reported that all the major hospitals in Beijing
were required to keep quiet about the SARS outbreak in order to create a
stable environment for the congressional session.93 During the Tenth NPC,
state power was smoothly handed over from one generation to another.
Mr. Hu Jintao was elected as the President of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and Mr. Wen Jiabao was appointed as the Premier of the
State Council.94 Mr. Zhang was reappointed as the Minster of Health at
this congressional session.95
Before the inauguration ceremony was over, the newly elected
government faced an unprecedented challenge. The SARS outbreak
presented two options: keep quiet and handle the crisis behind closed
doors, or take an open and transparent approach. In the past, national
emergencies, such as earthquakes, floods, and mining accidents, were
handled quietly by the government. Some scholars have referred to this as
a “black box” approach,96 under which the public becomes aware of the
situation only after the government has emerged victorious over the
catastrophe. For example, approximately 30,000 people became infected
with Hepatitis A in Shanghai in January of 1988.97 The Government of
Shanghai concealed news of this event until they controlled the situation.98
This “black box” approach was admittedly effective in protecting
Shanghai’s booming economy and jubilant image.99
92. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 36–37,
47, 50–52.
93. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 37.
94. Id. at 36–37.
95. Id. at 37.
96. Id. at 47.
97. Xie Songxin, City Fights Hepatitis A Epidemic, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 26, 1988.
98. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 51.
99. A news report about the outbreak appeared in the China Daily, an English-language
newspaper in China with very few domestic readers. The newspaper was subsequently disciplined for
revealing the top secret. Local news . . . kept absolute silence on the [outbreak].
This traditional approach still finds support today. In a lengthy article regarding the
SARS “whistle-blower,” one scholar accused Dr. Jiang of treason. [The scholar blamed Dr.
Jiang for damaging China’s image]. Clearly, the scholar was nostalgic for the old “black-box”
approach, a view taken by deep-rooted supporters of the rigid past.
CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 51 (internal citations omitted).
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In attempting to balance between economic loss and public health and
safety, the new government chose to emphasize public health. This
decision was not made easily. Steady economic growth and a stable social
environment had been the two major achievements of the former
government. The public had high hopes that the new government would
maintain economic growth. Choosing a transparent approach required the
government to forego economic gains and even suffer losses. For a nation
accustomed to the “black box” approach, openly dealing with the SARS
epidemic was a milestone. The new approach proved a tremendous
success. The new government earned a reputation as a people-loving
government that candidly addresses the serious social issues left over from
the economic boom of the 1990s.100
V. NEW REGULATIONS ON SARS
The SARS campaign took place from April 20 until June 24, 2003,
during which time two major pieces of legislation were enacted: (1)
Regulations on Dealing with the Outbreak of Public Health Emergencies
(Regulations),101 which was enacted by the State Council on May 9, 2003
and took effect on May 12, 2003,102 and (2) Measures on the Prevention
and Treatment of Infectious Atypical Pneumonia (Measures),103 which was
promulgated by the Ministry of Health and took effect on May 12, 2003.104
In addition, The Laws of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention
and Treatment of Infectious Diseases (PTID),105 which was originally
passed by the NPC Standing Committee in 1989, was republished on April
26, 2003 by the State Council.106 In summary, these laws and regulations
100. Zhao Ming, Diaocha xianshi feidian hou daxuesheng dui xinyijie lingdao jiti geng xinlai
[Polls show high approval rate among college students of the new leadership], ZHONGGOU JINGJI
SHIBAO [CHINA ECONOMIC TIMES], June 6, 2003, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-0605/1027191083s.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2004).
101. Tū Fā Gōug Gòng Weì Shēng shi Jian Ying Jì Tiáo Lì [Regulations on Dealing with the
Outbreak of Public Health Emergencies] (2003), translated in CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 111
[hereinafter Regulations].
102. Id.
103. Chuán Răn xing Fēi Diăn Xíng Fèi Yán Fáng Zhi Guăng Lĭ Bàn Fă [Measures on the
Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Atypical Pneumonia (SARS)] (2003), translated in CHENGLIN
LIU, supra note 14, at 123 [hereinafter Measures].
104. Id.
105. Zhōng Húa Rén Mín Gòng Hé Gúo Chuán Rân Bìng Fáng Zhi Fă [Law of the People’s
Republic of China on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases] (1989), translated in
CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 133, available at http://www.lawinfochina.com/dispecontent.asp?10
=1203&DB=1 (last visited Sept. 7, 2004) [hereinafter PTID].
106. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 56.
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addressed three issues: emergency information reporting, treatment, and
prevention.
A. Emergency Information Reporting
The most effective way to control the spread of the SARS epidemic is
to take prompt action and isolate the disease where it first strikes. The
speed and efficiency of modern travel allow disease to spread rapidly, and
any delay could result in the disease being transmitted to other regions.
Therefore, time is of the essence in preventing the spread of SARS.
The local government of Guangdong concealed SARS for nearly three
months.107 Beijing may have had time to take measures to prevent the
disease from entering the city if information about SARS had not been
concealed. Unfortunately, Beijing sat defenseless as SARS approached.108
To make matters worse, high-ranking health officials tried their best to
cover up the vital information once SARS cases began emerging in
Beijing.109 To disseminate information effectively, the new laws
specifically delineate when to report, how to report, to whom the original
report should go, and how the department receiving a report should deal
with the information.
1. Reporting Information110
Article 19 of the Regulations specifies that the Health Department of
the State Council shall be in charge of establishing an emergency reporting
system.111 Not more than nine hours may elapse from discovery to the
reporting of a case to the State Council, the highest authority.112 To
achieve this goal, articles 19 and 20 set forth several steps for governments
at various levels to follow.
First, according to article 19, if a public health emergency occurs a
provincial government that has received epidemic information has one
hour to report it to the Health Department of the State Council.113 The law
also requires the Health Department to report to the State Council when an
emergency is of a significant danger to the public.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 51.
Id.
Jakes, supra note 80.
This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 58–59.
Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 19.
CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 60.
Id. at 58 (citing Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 19).
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Second, article 20 requires medical institutions that have a confirmed
or suspected case of SARS promptly report this to the local county
government.114 After receiving the report, the local government and its
health department must forward it to higher levels of the government. This
transfer of information should not take more than two hours.
Additionally, article 20 provides a “fast track” for a health department
at the county level to issue a report directly to the State Council.115 The
usefulness of the “fast track” is questionable, though, because no health
department would be willing to employ it as the department is directly
under the control of local government, which appoints the department’s
members. Thus, the department’s members are unlikely to bypass those to
whom they are beholden for their positions.
The “fast track” is unlikely to be employed for other reasons as well.
First of all, a local health department generally will not bypass the local
government if the local government regulations are in conflict with central
authority regulations. In addition, the governments at prefecture and
provincial levels are reluctant to let a county health department send a
report directly to the Central Government without their permission.
Reporting an epidemic may result in administrative discipline or even
dismissal of officials at lower levels. Therefore, it is unlikely that local
health officials would take the bold step of reporting directly to Beijing
without first informing the local government. All of these factors make the
“fast track” almost impossible in practice.
Indeed, it appears that lawmakers were not confident in the “fast track”
when they drafted the law. Article 22, for example, requires the local
government or health department that receives a report to organize a
taskforce that will investigate and confirm the report.116
2. Releasing and Announcing Information117
While reporting relevant information is important, it is only the first
step toward establishing a transparent system. If information stops at a
higher level, the system ceases to function. The flow of information should
be vertical toward governments at higher levels and horizontal toward
related departments, neighboring regions, and the public.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 59 (citing Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 20).
Id. (citing Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 20).
Id. (citing Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 22).
This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 60–62.

2005]

REGULATING SARS IN CHINA

97

The reasons are threefold. First, regional communication is the key to
preventing an infectious disease from crossing borders. When health
workers in Guangdong first noticed an unusual disease, they promptly
reported it to health officials. Unfortunately, the officials did not share this
information with Hong Kong, its neighbor to the south. Similarly, the
disease may have been prevented from entering Beijing if the city had
taken proactive measures to control traffic between Guangzhou and Hong
Kong. Second, releasing information to other government departments is
vital to allow these departments to coordinate epidemic control measures.
The SARS epidemic demonstrated that preventive measures can not be
effectively implemented unless other departments, for example the
Ministry of Railways and the General Bureau of Airlines, are involved.
These departments are vital for screening passengers and stopping the
spread of SARS through the use of public transportation. Third, releasing
information to the public can effectively reduce casualties, prevent rumors
and panic, and win public support. Without public cooperation, the
massive quarantine in Beijing would not have been successful.
Lawmakers were aware of the problems caused by the lack of
horizontal flow of information in the beginning of the outbreak. Article 23
of the Regulations requires the State Council to promptly release
information to other related departments including hospitals and health
departments of the Army. The provision also stipulates that the Head
Official of any province experiencing an epidemic should inform
neighboring provinces or regions of the outbreak.118
However, article 23 is difficult to implement in practice. Under the
centralized system, emphasis is placed more on vertical subordination of
the local governments to the Central Government, rather than on
cooperation between local governments at the same level. This problem
can be traced back to Mao’s era (1949–1976), when self-reliance was
advocated and interregional contact was minimal. With the economic
reform, the increasing trade flow across provincial borders necessitated
closer coordination between different regions. However, there was no
system in place to facilitate this need. This is illustrated by the fact that, in
some extreme cases, even court judgments of one province are not
enforced in another.119 Thus, it should not be surprising that, during the
SARS outbreak, the spread of the virus was largely attributable to a lack of
cooperation and coordination among various regions.
118. Id. at 61 (citing Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 22).
119. See Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J. 255, 283 (2003).
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A system of making information public is described in article 25. The
Central Government must inform the public of any epidemic information
that provincial level governments report. The local government may then
be authorized by the Central Government to publicly announce possible
outbreaks independently. Article 25 states that the “announcement should
be up-to-date, accurate, and comprehensive.”120 However, article 25 does
not provide guidance on interpreting the phrase “up-to-date, accurate, and
comprehensive.” It is thus unclear how soon the public should be informed
after an epidemic is reported to the Central Government. Unlike the twohour time limit imposed on lower governments at various levels, there is
no specific provision in the Regulations that obligates the Central
Government to provide information to the public within a comparable time
frame. In the context of legal responsibility, no punishment is available if
the Central Government does not promptly announce vital information to
the public. In practice, article 25 gives the Central Government vast
discretion in deciding whether or when to release information about an
epidemic that was reported from lower governments or health
departments.
3. Individual’s Right to Report121
Lawmakers drafting the Regulations were concerned that the entire
reporting system would fail if any level of government did not promptly
pass along information. The situation in Beijing proved that an individual
can make a real difference in dispersing information and can in this sense,
help ensure that the transfer of information is maintained. In this regard,
Dr. Jiang served as a great example of individual reporting by releasing
vital information that Health Ministry grossly underreported.122
In the Regulations, the lawmakers embedded an important provision
for protecting whistleblowers. Article 24 provides that any unit or
individual has the right to report an outbreak of an epidemic to the relevant
government department, which in turn must conduct a thorough
investigation of the situation.123 The unit or individual who has informed
the government of an outbreak should be rewarded.
While the law provides that the informers should be rewarded, it does
not specify or refer to punishment for retaliation by the local government.

120.
121.
122.
123.

Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 25.
This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 62–64.
See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 63 (citing Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 24).
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The major concern for most people is how to go about life after revealing
the government’s failure. Informers who continue to live under the same
authority will be under constant pressure from the local government.
Therefore, even with the rights conferred by the Regulations, most
potential informers will likely choose to stay silent in the face of
government irregularities.
Although the law allows an individual to report a local government’s
failure to the government at higher levels, it does not specify whether the
individual enjoys the right to release related information to the media.
According to a notice issued by the Health Department in 1989 that is still
in force, no unit or individual may release and announce epidemic
information to foreign media or publish unannounced epidemic
information without the authorization of the Health Department.124
4. Legal Liabilities for Failing to Report Emergency Information125
Without adequate sanctions on those who impede the flow of
information, the reporting system would not be effective. Article 22 states
that any unit or individual should not conceal, delay, or falsely report
emergency information, or direct others to do so. The sanctions are set
forth in article 45 of the Regulations, which also states that the head of the
department is required to take all responsibility for a failure to report.
These penalties range from demotion to a lower administrative rank to
removal from one’s administrative position, depending on the seriousness
of the concealment. The article also leaves the door open for criminal
charges against the leader of a department if late reporting causes a
massive spread of the disease. The Supreme Court and Procuratorate have
interpreted the related articles of the Criminal Law regarding epidemic
prevention and detailed possible criminal charges against a person who
fails to report vital information. The penalties range from criminal
detention to imprisonment of up to three years.126
124. Id., at 63–64 (citing Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3, art. 24; Notice Regarding
Authorization on the Announcement of an Epidemic Situation, supra note 85).
125. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 64–65.
126. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 64. Article 16 of the Interpretation reads
After the State takes measures for the prevention and control of an epidemic of an infectious
disease, any of following shall be considered “a serious circumstance” under Article 409 of
the Criminal Law:
b. Concealing, delaying or filing a false report or directing others to do so about the
information on the epidemic, causing the spread of the epidemic.

100

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 4:81

It is important to note that article 16 of the Interpretation contains a
crucial clause that exempts high ranking officials from any criminal
punishments when they have concealed, delayed reporting, or made
misleading announcements about the epidemic before April 20, 2003. This
clause appears to strip away all legal grounds for possible criminal charges
against officials whose misconduct caused the spread of SARS.
Consequently, the former Minister Zhang and former Mayor Meng
were not subject to any criminal investigation for mishandling vital
information on SARS, because they were removed before the
Interpretation was promulgated.127
B. Treatment
Before the new laws were enacted, health departments issued a number
of guidelines to hospitals on the treatment and prevention of SARS. These
guidelines were issued in great haste and produced mixed results.
Nevertheless, these guidelines shaped many of the relevant provisions of
the new laws on SARS.
1. Designated Hospitals128
To deflect social attention away from SARS, especially during the
congressional session, the Health Ministry required all SARS patients to
be treated at the hospitals where they were admitted. This method was
referred to as the “absorb” method. Officials hoped that hospitals could
treat SARS cases and eliminate the disease without causing public panic
like that in Guangzhou. The “absorb” method was consistent with the
“black box” approach.
The “absorb” requirement was a complete failure. Hospitals not only
failed to provide proper care to SARS patients, but the hospitals

Article 409 of the Criminal Law
Any functionary of an administrative department for public health who is engaged in
prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, through his gross neglect of duty, causes the
spread or epidemic of an infectious disease, if the circumstances are serious, shall be
sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention.
Id. at 64–65 (citing Zuì Gáo Rén Mín Fă Yuàn Zuì Gāo Rén Mín Jiăn Chá Yuàn Guān Yú Bàn Lĭ Fáng
Haì Yù Fáng Kòng Zhi Tū Fā Chuán Răn Bìng Yì Qíng Dĕng Zāi Hài De Xíng Shì Àn Jiàn Jù TY Ying
Yòng Fă Lùl Ruò Gān Wèn Tí De Jiĕ Shì [The Interpretation of Laws in Criminal Cases Regarding
Obstruction of the Prevention and Control of the Outbreak of Infectious Diseases], art. 16, translated
in CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 146) [hereinafter Interpretation].
127. See Li Qing, supra note 63.
128. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 68–72.
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themselves became a source of infection. The No. 1 People’s Hospital of
Beijing University, where ninety-three medical personnel were infected, is
an unfortunate example. It is unknown how many patients who were
treated at the hospital contracted SARS. In order to prevent further
infection, the whole hospital was sealed off with all medical personnel and
patients kept inside for two weeks.
In analyzing the causes for the cross-infection, the People’s Hospital
director explained that, because the hospital was originally designed to
accept over one million patients annually, the service sections were
streamlined to accommodate a high patient flow. Blood test labs, X-ray
units, billing offices, pharmacies and other service stations were located
close together. The People’s Hospital, as a result, did not effectively adapt
to cope with the SARS epidemic, even though it was one of the best
equipped hospitals in Beijing. For small hospitals, it was almost
impossible to meet the unprecedented challenge of quarantine due to
budgetary constraints.129
The catastrophe in the People’s Hospital and other hospitals caused
health officials to revisit the so-called “absorb” method. Based on the
experience in Guangdong, some experts proposed designating a few
hospitals with good medical facilities as SARS-designated hospitals
suitable for treating infectious diseases. These designated hospitals played
an important role in lowering the cross-infection rate at the start of the
outbreak; however, the sharp increase of SARS patients soon caused these
hospitals to be overwhelmed. The government decided to construct a
specialized SARS hospital in a suburb of Beijing.130 This new hospital,
containing 1,000 beds, was built in only seven days131 and accepted the
first group of patients on May 1, 2003.132 By the time the last patients were
discharged less than two months later, the new hospital had admitted 680
patients, of whom only eight died of SARS. As a result, the new hospital
substantially reduced the pressure that hospitals in the urban areas faced.133
Based on the lessons learned from the early effort in combating SARS,
article 23 of the Measures provides that SARS patients must be treated in
a designated SARS hospital. As previously mentioned, not all hospitals are
suited to accommodate the special needs of SARS patients. Accordingly,
129. See WHO Press Briefing, supra note 87.
130. Beijing shi di si fangzhi feidian gongzuo xiwen fabuhui xianchang shilu [Beijing SARS
Control Center News Conference No. 4], QUIANLONG XIWEN WANG, May 6, 2003, available at
http://news.sohu.com/41/36/news209073641.shtml (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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the law specifies that designated hospitals must be equipped with the
necessary facilities and staffed with experienced health workers.134
These detailed provisions are reinforced by a broadly-sweeping
delegation of power to the local government. To ensure that the urgent
needs of the designated facilities are met, articles 32 and 33 of the
Regulations grant the government broad powers to mobilize medical
materials and health workers in the event of an emergency.
2. Fever Clinics at Regular Hospitals135
To ensure that regular hospitals continue to provide medical care for
non-SARS patients, article 24 of the Measures requires that all regular
hospitals set up fever clinics for patients who have a fever or are suspected
to have been infected with SARS. Separate fever clinics must be staffed
with medical personnel who have knowledge of infectious diseases and
the training necessary for dealing with them. Fever clinics are designed to
serve only as transit stations where patients suspected of being infected
with SARS receive their initial medical observations and treatments.
These patients must be transferred to the appointed hospitals as soon as
possible. Meanwhile, the fever clinics must report the cases to the local
government, as well as the health department. Article 25 of the Measures
specifies these duties of hospitals in dealing with SARS patients.136
Setting up fever clinics in regular hospitals was not without problems.
While the fever clinics reduced the chances of cross-infection in the
hospitals, the public remained skeptical of their effectiveness, especially
after People’s Hospital was closed. As a result, the number of hospital
stays declined sharply in Beijing and other cities. Absent a life-threatening
illness that needed immediate medical attention, most people chose to stay
at home. A report from Jilin University Hospital indicated that hospital
visits were reduced by nearly seventy-eight percent in May.137 Patients in
several cases declined better hospital treatment for fear of being infected
with SARS. In April, the death rate among patients with chronic illnesses
in Changchun jumped threefold compared with that in March.138
134. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 71 (citing Measures, supra note 103, ch. 5 art. 23).
135. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 72–74.
136. Id. at 73; see Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3 art. 24; Measures, supra note 103, ch. 3 art.
25.
137. Zhang Yulai, Miandui feidian: hui feidan jiyi bi feidian geng kepa [Fear of Going to
Hospital is Worse than SARS], PEOPLE’S NET, June 12, 2003, at http://past.people.com.cn/GB/
other4583/4588/5815/20030612/1015892.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004)).
138. Id.
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3. Free Treatment for SARS Patients139
The new laws also specify that hospitals should provide free treatment
to SARS patients who cannot afford medical expenses.140 In some reported
cases, hospitals refused or delayed admission to SARS patients. For
example, seven people were sent to the Hospital of Inner Mongolia
Medical School on April 16, 2003, and were all diagnosed as suspected
SARS patients. However, the hospital refused to admit them because the
patients could not afford the deposit of RMB 2,000 ($241) per person.
Refusing to accept SARS patients jeopardizes the patient’s health and
safety and puts the public at a higher risk because the disease is extremely
infectious. Citing the law on infectious disease, the Health Ministry issued
an urgent notice on April 22, 2003 that required all hospitals to accept
SARS patients without exception. The circular warned that any individual
who refused to admit SARS patients could face administrative discipline
or even criminal investigations if the refusal caused serious
consequences.141 The Measures included a similar provision in article 29.
The government encountered enormous challenges in implementing the
above rules. There are several reasons that hospitals were reluctant to
admit SARS patients. First, they were afraid that the spread of the virus
would put doctors, nurses, and patients in great danger because medical
workers were among the very first victims of the outbreak. Second, after
the economic reform in the 1980s, hospitals were pushed into market
reliance. Many of the hospitals heavily relied on the revenue coming from
patients. High cross-infection rates would hurt a hospital’s reputation, thus
reducing the volume of patient visits. Third, SARS treatment could be
extremely expensive, costing hospitals up to RMB 100,000 ($12,000) per
patient. To conform to the laws, hospitals had to cover the costs for
patients without health insurance. Even though the Central Government
required local departments to pay the medical expenses for the uninsured,
these departments did not always keep their promises as they are reported
to have withheld the funds for an indefinite period of time, or dispersed
the specialized funds for other purposes.
139. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.4, at 74–76.
140. Measures, supra note 103, ch. 4, art. 29.
141. Tian Yu & Zhang Jingyong, Tuiwei jushou feidan bingren yao fu falu zeren [Refusal to
Accept SARS Patients may Result in Legal Responsibilities], XINHUA NEWS, Apr. 22, 2003, available
at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/20030420/976414.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
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To solve the financial pressure facing both patients and hospitals, the
Ministry of Finance allocated RMB 2 billion ($242 million) for SARS
prevention and treatment, a considerable portion of which was used for
covering the treatment of the uninsured SARS patients.142 The provincial
governments were also encouraged to set up special financial reserves for
dealing with the emergency.
On April 28, 2003, the government of Hubei province issued a notice
that the government would pay the medical costs for SARS patients and
suspected SARS cases. In order to do so, a special fund in the amount of
RMB 20 million ($2.41 million) was established for SARS prevention and
treatment. The fund was to cover the medical expenses of farmers, migrant
workers, and urban residents who contracted SARS and were without
medical insurance. For those who had medical insurance, but whose
medical expenses exceeded the insurance coverage, the fund would be
used to cover the difference. The notice also required that no hospital be
allowed to refuse SARS patients or unnecessarily transfer them.143
It was difficult to implement the financial aid rules with regard to
SARS patients who could not afford the medical expenses. SARS is not a
disease that can be diagnosed right away. In most cases, patients have to
be put under observation and go through various tests. If the patient is not
eventually diagnosed with SARS, he must pay his own bill. For example, a
migrant worker at a construction site in Beijing was put under
epidemiological observation at a hospital in April 2003. As no further
symptoms developed, he was discharged two weeks later, but was billed
RMB 5,000 ($600), which was approximately equal to his total annual
income.144
142. Qi Zhongxi, Caizhengbu gongbu zhongyang caizheng 20 yi feidian fangzhi jijin de yongtu
[The Ministry of Finance Allocated 2 Billion Yuan for SARS Prevention and Treatment], XINHUA
NEWS, Apr. 30, 2003, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/3586/20030423/
978677.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
143. Hubei Xuanbu: Feidianxing feiyan huanzhe Zhiliao jingfei yilv mianfei [Hu Bei Announces
All the Medical Charges for SARS Treatment Exempted], SICHUAN ZAI XIAN [SICHUAN ONLINE], Apr.
28, 2003, available at http://domestic.scol.com.cn/dfbb/20030428/2003428140649.htm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2004).
144. Qieduan SARS chuanbo xumai sandao kan [Three Hurdles to Cutting SARS Transmission],
JINGHUA TIMES, June 1, 2003, http://business.sohu.com/73/62/article209686273.shtml (last visited
Sept. 5, 2003).
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C. Prevention
1. Screening Migrant Workers145
One significant result of the open reform policies carried out since the
late 1970s has been the vanishing of hukou, the rigid residential
registration system that restricted people from working across regions. As
a result, the workforce has become mobilized.146 According to the ViceMayor of Beijing, 620,000 migrant workers were working in more than
3600 construction sites during the SARS outbreak in Beijing.147 This
number did not include the migrant workers who accounted for the major
workforces in other industries, such as restaurants, hotels, home services,
furniture making and moving, plumbing, waste disposal, and so on. The
exact number of migrant workers in Beijing is unknown.
As the SARS situation worsened, many migrant workers in Beijing
began to flee the city and return to their hometowns. In some cases,
migrant workers escaped mandatory quarantine in Beijing and took a train
home. For example, Mr. Xu left No. 261 Hospital in Beijing without
permission. On his way back to Sichuan Province, Xu had a high fever and
was diagnosed as a suspected SARS case. Eight people who had contact
with Xu on the train were subsequently put under observation.148
145. This Part is adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.5, at 80–82.
146. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 80.
In addition, the growing rural population and the diminishing arable farmland have combined
to contribute to the surplus of labor resources in remote areas. Since the 1980s, a growing
number of migrant workers have stormed into cities large and small, searching for jobs and
better lives. The migrant workers have assumed jobs that require manual labor and long
hours, and they have become an indispensable workforce in the cities. While migrant worker
[sic] have made great contributions to improve urban standards of living, they are also blamed
for social problems and rising crime rates.
Id. See Zhang Ye, Migrant Woman Workers and the Emerging Civil Society in China, ASIA
FOUNDATION, http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/ZhangYe.BSR.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
147. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 80. See Zhang Mao, guanyu jinyi shiqi Beijing fangzhi
feidianxing feiyan gongzuo qingkuang baogao [A Work Report on the Recent Work of SARS
Prevention and Treatment in Beijing], QUIANLONG WANG, May 30, 2003, http://beijing.qianlong.com/
3925/2003-5-30/83@872492.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
On behalf of the Municipality, Zhang Mao, the Vice Mayor of Beijing, presented this to the
fourth meeting of the 12th Session of People’s Congress of Beijng on May 30, 2003. At the
end of May, the numbers of SARS patients dropped sharply and the overall situation of the
epidemic improved significantly. This is a comprehensive report that documented the major
measures taken by Beijing Government [sic] in combating SARS. However, the report did not
include the challenges that the city faced. It is a good source for finding basic statistics
regarding the SARS epidemic.
CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 80–81 n.57.
148. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 80–82 (citing Li Xuemei, Yi fashao mingong shanli Beijing,
tongche jiechuzhe quanbu geli [A Migrant Worker with High Fever Left Beijing Without Permission,
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The wave of migration was of great concern to the government because
these migrant workers could bring the virus back to their home provinces.
These workers usually came from poor rural regions where medical
networks barely existed. Though SARS has no cure, high quality medical
care plays an important role in treating the complications resulting from a
SARS infection. If workers set off an epidemic back home, the
consequences would be unimaginable.
The Vice Governor of Hebei Province expressed great concern about
migrant workers who returned home from SARS-affected areas such as
Beijing and Guangdong. 2.9 million migrant workers came from Hebei,
800,000 of whom were working in Beijing. By May 28, around 1.28
million of those migrant workers were returning home. On April 28 alone,
there were 250,000 returnees. To ease the return waves, the government
arranged for neighbors to take care of the wheat fields for those who were
working in Beijing or Guangzhou in order to encourage the migrant
workers to stay where they were.149
In the meantime, local governments took measures to monitor the
returning migrant workers closely to keep the virus out of their regions.150
Screening measures included setting up checkpoints at local train stations
and bus stops, and imposing quarantine on all the returnees for two weeks.
Also, to reduce the danger of spreading SARS to those migrant
workers’ hometowns, the government required all the companies that
employed migrant workers to comply strictly with the so-called “threelocal principles”: First, the prevention work for healthy workers must be
carried out locally. Second, epidemiological observation of the workers in
close contact with SARS patients must be conducted locally. Third,
confirmed cases must be treated locally. If any company failed to do so,
various sanctions would be imposed. For example, in April, Dahua
Company’s license for conducting construction projects in the Beijing
market was revoked due to its failure to control migrant workers. The
license was revoked when 101 migrant workers fled Beijing to their home
provinces after a worker was infected with SARS.151 The “three local”
principles were codified in article 28 of the Measures.
all Persons in Close Contact have been Quarantined], XINHUA NET, June 7, 2003, available at
http://www.scol.com.cn/domestic/szlb/20030607/200367171905.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2004)).
149. Ruan Yulin, Hebei Gaoguang: Nongcun kangji feidian yali zuida de shi fanxiang mingong
[Hebei High-Ranking Official: The Biggest Pressure for Combating SARS Comes from Returning
Migrant Workers], ZHONG XIN NEWS, May 29, 2003, available at http://www.scol.com.cn/domestic/
dfbb/20030529/2003529112440.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
150. Id.
151. Pei Yanlong & Li Jianlong, Guanli shikong mingong lijing, danwei fangfei buli bei qingchu
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2. Intentional Spreading of SARS152
Not all SARS patients were cooperative when facing compulsory
quarantine. First, some people who had close contact with SARS patients
or suspected cases did not believe that they were infected and felt it was a
waste of time for them to be put into isolation. In addition, because many
hospitals became sources of infection in the beginning, most people were
afraid of being infected with the disease in the isolation wards. Second,
both SARS-designated hospitals and the isolation wards in regular
hospitals were set up in a great hurry in order to comply with the
government requirements. As a result, the conditions in these hospitals and
wards were poor. In remote regions, the conditions were even worse.
There were several reported cases where SARS patients or persons
suspected to be infected with SARS escaped quarantine and caused SARS
to spread. On rare occasions, the patients were believed to have spread
SARS deliberately.
On May 5, 2003, Li Song was arrested on charges of obstructing the
prevention of infectious disease and treatment, and endangering public
security through dangerous means, in violation of the Criminal Law. Li
Song, a doctor at the Ba Meng Rail Service Hospital, attended a training
program at Beijing University of Chinese Medicine from February to
March, 2003. He fell ill on March 20 in Beijing, but was not immediately
diagnosed with SARS. Li Song went back home to Lihe by train on March
27, 2003, and was treated at his father’s clinic. After April 6, Li Song’s
father, mother, wife, two brothers, sister-in-law, and a nurse at the clinic,
who attended to Li’s family, developed the same symptoms. On April 12,
Li’s father became the first in Linhe to die of SARS, with Li’s mother and
wife dying of the same disease in the following days. 102 SARS cases
were subsequently reported in Lihe, many of which could be traced to Li,
the first SARS patient in that region.153
After being transferred from his father’s clinic to Ba Meng Hospital, Li
allegedly left his ward on April 8 and was seen in public for eight hours.
Beijing shichang [A Company was Driven Out of the Beijing Market for Not Being Able to Prevent
Migrant Workers Fleeing the Capital During the Outbreak], BEIJING YULE XINBAO [BEIJING
ENTERTAINMENT POST], May 12, 2003, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/47/20030512/
989668.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
152. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 83–85.
153. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 83, citing Li Zebing & Zhang yunlung, Neimenggu daibu
yiming shexian fanzui de feidian bingren [A SARS Patient was Arrested as a Criminal Suspect in
Inner-Mongolia], GUANGMING RIBAO [GUANGMING DAILY], May 8, 2003, http://www.gmw.cn/
01gmrb/2003-05/08/2003-05-08-Homepage.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2004).
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Li was brought back to the hospital by the local police department.
Because Li was diagnosed with SARS on April 12, it was not clear
whether he was put into isolation and was under compulsory quarantine
when he left the hospital; nonetheless, Li Song was later charged with
deliberately spreading SARS, under articles 114 and 115(1) of the
Criminal Law (dealing with crimes of endangering public security through
using dangerous means).154
Li’s case was regarded as the first in which the government resorted to
criminal sanctions in order to impose compulsory quarantine on a SARS
patient. It was widely believed that Li’s case directly led to the
promulgation of the interpretation of the relevant articles of the Criminal
Law regarding public safety jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court
and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (Interpretation). According to this
Interpretation, those who cause death or serious injury by deliberately
spreading the virus can be sentenced to a fixed prison term ranging from
ten years to life imprisonment. They may even face the death penalty.155

154. Li was also charged with obstructing the prevention and treatment of an infectious disease
due to his behavior after he was diagnosed with SARS.
On the day his father died, Li Song was diagnosed with SARS and was put into isolation.
Stricken by the sudden loss of close family members, Li blamed the medical staff for not
providing enough medical care to his father. He smashed a window and assaulted a doctor. Li
became even more furious when he learned that his father’s corpse could not be dressed in a
traditional Chinese manner [because] the health authorities had disposed of the corpse
according to the Implementing Measures of the PTID in order to prevent further spread of the
disease.
CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 84.
155. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 83–84 (citing SARS Patient Arrested, supra note 153).
Article 1 of the Interpretation states: “Whoever intentionally spreads the pathogens of a sudden
infectious disease and endangers public security shall be punished in according [to] Articles 114 and
115 (1) of the Criminal Law on crimes of endangering public security through using dangerous
means.” Interpretation, supra note 126, art. 1.
Whoever commits arson, breaches a dike, causes explosion, spreads poison or uses other
dangerous means to sabotage any factory, mine, oilfield, harbor, river, water source,
warehouse, house, forest, farm, threshing ground, pasture, key pipeline, public building or
any other public or private property, thereby endangering public security but causing no
serious consequences, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three
years but not more than 10 years.
Zhōng Huá Rén Mín Gòng Hé Guó Xíng Fă [People’s Republic of China’s Criminal Law], art. 114
(Ch.) (1997), http://www.lawinfochina.com/dispccontent.asp?10=12185&DB=1 (last visited Sept. 7,
2004) [hereinafter Criminal Law].
Whoever commits arson, breaches a dike, causes explosion, spreads poison or inflicts serious
injury or death on people or causes heavy losses of public or private property by other
dangerous means, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than 10 years,
life imprisonment or death.
Criminal Law, art. 115(1).
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As of this writing, there is no follow-up report on Li’s case. It is
unclear whether Li was held according to the Criminal Law.
3. Railroads156
The railroads are the primary means of transportation for long-distance
travel in China. These trains are often overloaded with passengers, and
there is insufficient air circulation within the crowded compartments. If a
SARS patient sits in a compartment for hours, if not days, there will be a
substantial risk to the passengers around him due to the fact that SARS can
be spread through respiratory droplets. In addition, as trains make frequent
stops at various cities and towns, it is very difficult to conduct
epidemiological investigations on those in close contact with SARS
patients.
On April 12, 2003, the Transportation Ministry, Railroad Ministry,
Airline Bureau, Health Ministry, and Finance Ministry jointly issued a
notice requiring that their related departments take measures to prevent
SARS from spreading through public transportation, including trains,
boats, long distance buses, and airplanes. This notice required that “stay
stations” be set up in the cities where transportation stations are located to
provide a place where SARS patients or suspected cases found on the
carriers can be accepted. To establish the “stay stations”, the local
government was to provide financial aid, technical support and the
necessary equipment. Once a SARS patient (or suspected patient) was
discovered on public transportation, the responsible head of the carrier was
required to promptly contact the next closest “stay station” and arrange a
drop-off for those patients to receive medical observation, quarantine, and
treatment. All “stay stations” were obligated to accept these patients. The
carrier was also to take measures necessary to enhance air circulation, and
trace and record the identities of persons who have been in close contact
with SARS patients. The notice also authorized the departments of
transportation to persuade persons showing SARS symptoms not to use
public transportation.157 Some of these requirements were incorporated in
article 38 of the Regulations.
156. This Part was adopted with permission from CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, § 4.2, at 85–87.
157. Wu bu men tangzhi yan fang tongguo jiaotong gongju chuanbo feidian [Ministry of Health et
al., Notice Regarding the Related Problems on the Strict Prevention of the Spread of SARS through the
Use of Public Transportation], Apr. 12, 2003, available at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-0414/26/294190.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2004), translated in CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 151.
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The notice was jointly promulgated by the five ministries because
SARS prevention on public transportation needed close and harmonious
cooperation among various administrative jurisdictions. In implementing
the notice, the transportation departments encountered enormous
challenges from local authorities. The major concern of the local
governments was that accepting SARS patients might set off the epidemic
locally, which could defeat preventive efforts by the local governments.
The following complaint illustrates the pressure that railroads placed on
the local governments.
On May 8, 2003, the Railroad Ministry received a formal complaint
from the government of Shanxi Province. The complaint dealt with
difficulties that the localities faced in dealing with the people dropped off
from trains. From April 24 to May 5, Datong Medical Institutions received
twenty-five persons who either had a fever or had close contact with
suspected SARS patients from the train station. According to the
complaint, most of the passengers (who were often taken off the trains in
the middle of their journey) did not believe they that they had SARS and
were not at all cooperative with the epidemiological inspection procedure.
Since none of the suspected patients were from Datong, it was difficult for
the local government to accommodate these passengers. Finally, the
twenty-five passengers were all released because the local hospitals
concluded that they were all “healthy.” All of the passengers who were
dropped off from one train managed to get onto another and go home.158
VI. THE SARS LAWS ARE NEITHER ORIGINAL NOR A BREAKTHROUGH
The new SARS regulations clearly played a crucial role in controlling
the epidemic in June of 2003. However, the ideas in the new regulations
are not original. Both the Regulations and the Measures promulgated in
May of 2003 bear a striking resemblance to the Law of the People’s
Republic of China on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases
(PTID)159 and its implementing rules, The Implementing Rules of the
PTID.160 Thus, the new laws were not the breakthrough in Chinese health
law that the government claimed.
158. Hu Yifeng et al., Yinying Longzhao Tieluwang [Railroad Transportation Under SARS
Shadow], CAIJING MAGAZINE, May 25, 2003, available at
http://business.sohu.com/06/08/
article209500806.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2004).
159. The PTID consists of 41 articles in seven chapters: general provisions, prevention, epidemic
reporting procedure, control, supervision, legal responsibilities, and supplementary provisions.
160. The Implementing Rules of the PTID (1991), translated in CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at
161 [hereinafter Implementing Rules]. The Implementing Rules, which include seventy-three articles,
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The NPC Standing Committee enacted the PTID in 1989 in response to
a Hepatitis A epidemic that plagued Shanghai in 1988, during which
approximately 30,000 people were infected.161 The purpose of the law was
to prevent, control and eliminate the outbreak of infectious diseases in the
future.162 The Ministry of Health promulgated The Implementing Rules of
the PTID in 1991.
Even though the PTID and its implementing rules were legally
effective during the SARS outbreak and remain in effect, the government
and health officials for the most part ignored these laws. After April 20,
2003 the Central Government attempted to control SARS through legal
means. One effort was to republish the PTID on April 26 in order to raise
public awareness of this law.163 It is noteworthy that the PTID had to be
re-promulgated by the State Council in order to “activate” its binding
force.164 During the SARS outbreak, little reference was made to the
Implementing Rules of the PTID.
Like any other law, the PTID and its implementing rules are not
perfect. However, these laws anticipated a major public health emergency
and provided operational guidelines for dealing with such an emergency.
If the laws had been observed, the SARS epidemic would not have erupted
as a national catastrophe.
A. The PTID Guiding Principles for Prevention and Treatment of
Infectious Diseases
The principles of the PTID are to: (1) give top priority to prevention;
(2) combine prevention with treatment; and (3) prevent and treat different
diseases accordingly.165 Based on these principles, the law requires health
departments and hospitals to carry out their respective duties in preventing
and controlling epidemic diseases.166 To ensure that different types of
diseases are dealt with according to their seriousness, the PTID classifies
infectious diseases into three categories. Thirty-three diseases are
classified in A, B, and C categories according to their seriousness and
further details the provisions in the PTID.
161. For a detailed report on the epidemic in 1988, see Xie Songxin, City Fights Hepatitis A
Epidemic, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 26, 1988 (copy on file with author).
162. PTID, art. 1.
163. The PTID was republished in XINHUA NEWS on Apr. 26, 2003. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note
14, at 39.
164. CHENGLIN LIU, supra note 14, at 106.
165. PTID, ch. I, art. 2.
166. Id. ch. I, arts. 4, 6, 7.
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pattern of infection.167 For example, plague and cholera are the only listed
Class A diseases, while AIDS/HIV is among many listed as a Class B
disease. Only under special circumstances may the State Council add or
remove a disease from the Class A category of infectious diseases,168
while the Ministry of Health is authorized to make changes to the B and C
categories.169 SARS was officially added to the Class B diseases on April
10, 2003.170
The “prevention first” principle was not seriously implemented before
the SARS epidemic. Mr. Gao, the Executive Vice Minister of Health,
admitted that a weak epidemic surveillance system was among the major
causes of the SARS outbreak in 2003.171 Unqualified personnel staffed the
institutions in charge of quarantine and inspection. These institutions were
constantly underfunded and lacked functional equipment for monitoring
and preventing epidemics. As a result, the epidemic surveillance network
failed to pick up early signals of SARS transmission.172
B. The PTID Preventive Measures
Among many other requirements, the PTID specifies that cities and
city districts must designate hospitals for infectious disease treatment. In
addition, infectious disease clinics and wards must be set up in regular
hospitals to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.173 Strict measures
must also be taken to prevent iatrogenic infections and cross-infections
within hospital and research institutes.174 Sewage and human waste
contaminated by infectious diseases must be disinfected and properly
disposed.175 Bacterial and viral strains must be properly transported and
stored.176 At the onset of the SARS epidemic, none of these requirements
167. Id. ch. I, art. 3.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Weishengbu fuzeren biaoshi “feidian” naru chuanran bing fanzhi fa guanli [A Ministry
of Health Official Announced SARS was Officially Added to the List of Infectious Diseases in the
PTID], CHINA YOUTH DAILY, Apr. 11, 2003, at http://news.sohu.com/53/84/news208368453.shtml
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
171. GAO QIANG, GUANYU JIANLI JIANQUAN TUFA GONGGONG WEISHENG SHIJIAN YINGJI JIZHI
GONGZUO QINGKUANG DE BAOGAO [WORK REPORT ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MECHANISM
DEALING WITH PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES], ZHONGGUO RENDA XINWEN [CHINA PEOPLE’S
CONGRESS NEWS], Apr. 12, 2004, at http://www.peopledaily.cn/GB/14576/28320/32776/32780/
2443144.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
172. See id.
173. PTID, supra note 105, ch. II, art. 11.
174. Id. art. 20.
175. Id. art. 17.
176. Id. art. 16.
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had been implemented. On the contrary, the Administrative Health
Department required that SARS patients be treated at the hospitals where
they were admitted. This so-called “absorb” method resulted in serious
cross-infection, which turned hospitals into a source of infection. The
“absorb” method was a blunt violation of the PTID because it did nothing
to prevent the spread of the disease and, in fact, encouraged it.
Unfortunately, no officials took legal responsibility under the PTID.
C. The PTID Information Reporting System
The PTID requires anyone discovering an infectious disease patient (or
one suspected of having an infectious disease) to report the case to the
nearest health department.177 Health care workers who discover the
diseases specified in the PTID, must make a report to the relevant
departments.178 It is illegal to conceal, withhold, or make false reports
regarding an epidemic, or to direct others to do so.179 After receiving
information regarding an epidemic, the Health Department of the State
Council must release it to the public.180 The law provides that the Ministry
of Health may also authorize a provincial government to release the
information to the public within their respective territories.181
Furthermore, the Implementing Rules of the PTID set forth detailed
requirements for reporting information about an epidemic. If a case of a
Class A disease is discovered, the relevant health workers must report the
case to the local health department within six hours in urban areas, or
within twelve hours if in rural areas.182 If a case of a Class B disease is
discovered, the case must be reported to the local health department within
twelve hours in urban areas, or within twenty-four hours if rural areas.183
The local health department receiving the report must report the case to the
higher health department and the local government at the same time.184
After receiving the report of the occurrence of a Class A disease, the
health department at the provincial level must report the case to the
Ministry of Health within six hours.185 The epidemic reporting system

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

PTID, supra note 105, ch. III, art. 21.
Id.
Id. art. 22.
Id. art. 23.
Id.
Implementing Rules, supra note 160, ch. II, art. 35.
Id.
Id. ch. III, art. 36.
Id.

114

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 4:81

defined by the PTID and its implementing rules were sound and
operational. However, the Chinese government ignored these mandates
during the SARS outbreak. The epidemic reporting system established in
the new laws closely resembles that in the PTID and its implementing
rules.
On at least two occasions, health officials cited the PTID as an excuse
for withholding SARS information,186 claiming that SARS was not on the
list of infectious diseases in the PTID. This strict reading of the PTID led
them to conclude, incorrectly, that it was not necessary to release the
information to the public.187 While the PTID does not authorize the local
government to add a new disease to the list, the Implementing Rules of the
PTID require local health departments to promptly report a previously
unknown infectious disease to the local government and to take necessary
measures to control the disease.188 After receiving the report about the
outbreak of SARS, a previously unknown disease, the local government of
Guangdong should have immediately reported this to the Ministry of
Health and announced the information to the public with the Ministry of
Health’s authorization.189 Therefore, there was no legitimate ground for
the government to conceal the vital information that an epidemic was
occurring.
D. The PTID Epidemic Control Measures
According to the PTID, if a hospital or any other health care institution
has discovered any specified infectious disease, it must take necessary
measures to quarantine and treat the patients.190 Patients are required to
cooperate with the quarantine measures.191 The local government is
authorized to restrict or suspend trade fairs, school classes, and other large
gatherings.192 If necessary, authorities may also close water resources.193
186. See Ten Questions, supra note 64 (Guangdong Health Officials cited the PTID); Weishengbu
gongbu zhongguo feidianxing feiyan fangzhi qingkuang bing da jizhe wen [The Ministry of Health
Announced SARS Information and Answered Reporters’ Questions], Apr. 3, 2003, at
http://www.cctv.com/news/china/20030403/100966.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
187. See PTID, supra note 105, ch. III.
188. Implementing Rules, supra note 160, ch. IV, art. 51.
189. See PTID, supra note 105, ch. III, art. 23.
190. Id. ch. IV.
191. Id. art. 24.
192. Id. art. 25.
193. Id.
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In the event of an outbreak of Class A or B diseases, the local government
may seal off the affected area and declare it an epidemic zone.194
None of the above measures were carried out when the first clusters of
SARS cases were identified in Guangdong. The spread of SARS to Hong
Kong and Beijing could have been prevented if the local government had
taken actions to control traffic between Guangdong and other cities in
accordance with the PTID.
Overall, the 2003 laws on SARS follow the structure of the PTID.
While some improvements and variations were made, a considerable
number of provisions of the new laws merely reiterated what the PTID and
its implementing rules already mandated. Despite their shortcomings, the
PTID and its implementing rules were well structured and carefully
thought out. The laws were enacted in 1989 to prevent future public health
emergencies. Unfortunately, these laws were set aside when another
epidemic broke out, fourteen years later, in 2003.
E. The Latest Amendment to the PTID
On August 28, 2004, the eleventh session of the Tenth NPC passed
sweeping amendments to the PTID.195 The revised version nearly doubled
its provisions, growing in number from forty-one to eighty articles. Two
new chapters were added that incorporated lessons learned from dealing
with the SARS epidemic in 2003. The revised version of the PTID
retained “prevention-first” as the guiding principle in dealing with
infectious diseases.196 The following part highlights some of the
significant changes made in the amended PTID.
First, the new amendments adjust the disease classifications of the
PTID. SARS, Avian Flu and tuberculosis are now included as Class B
diseases,197 and the new law authorizes the State Council to add previously
unknown diseases to the list if the new diseases require preventive
measures comparable to those of Class A or Class B diseases.198 In fact,
this article is a modified version of article 51 of the PTID Implementing
Rules. It is hoped that this change will close the loophole used by various
194. Id. art. 26
195. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious
Diseases (2004), at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-08/30/content_1924490.htm (last visited
Oct. 19, 2004) [hereinafter PTID (revised)]. There is currently no English translation available.
196. PTID (revised), art. 2.
197. PTID (revised), art. 3.
198. PTID (revised), art. 4.
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high officials who had cited the old PTID as an excuse for not taking
prompt action to control SARS.199
Second, the new law revamps the epidemic reporting system.200 In
addition to reiterating the vertical reporting schemes, the new law stresses
the importance of releasing information horizontally to neighboring
regions.201 The new law also requires the government to announce
epidemic situations periodically.202 Unlike SARS regulations, however,
the new law does not prescribe a fixed time frame for reporting, releasing,
and announcing information about an outbreak.203
Third, the new law emphasizes the government’s role in coping with
future epidemics. The law requires that infectious disease prevention be a
part of the government’s social and economic development plan.204 The
purpose of adding this article is to show that epidemic prevention is an
integral and permanent part of the government’s regular responsibilities.
Under the new law, the various levels of government are required to
establish and maintain a functional epidemic surveillance system and
routinely evaluate the epidemic situation in their respective regions.205 The
central government is required to provide financial assistance to inner
regions where the economy lags far behind, and provide adequate training
to the medical personnel there to increase the capability of those regions to
handle sudden epidemics.206 The law also requires hospitals to accept
infectious disease patients and provide free treatment to those who can not
afford their medical expenses.207
Fourth, the new law strikes a balance between the protection of the
rights of individuals and the public interest. To protect patients’ privacy,
the new law prohibits hospitals from releasing patients’ medical records.208
Any violation of this provision can result in administrative sanction or
possible criminal liability.209 In order to increase cooperation from
patients, the new law requires that patients be continuously paid by their
employers during quarantine or isolation.210 On the other hand, the new

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text.
PTID (revised), arts. 30–38.
PTID (revised), art. 35(2).
PTID (revised), art. 38.
Cf. Regulations, supra note 101, ch. 3; see supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
PTID (revised), art. 59.
PTID (revised), art. 60.
Id.
PTID (revised), art. 52.
PTID (revised), art. 12.
PTID (revised), art. 68(5).
PTID (revised), art. 41(2).
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law provides stricter rules on quarantine and isolation. For example, under
the previous law, suspected carriers of Class A diseases were only subject
to epidemiological observation at appointed facilities.211 The new law
provides that suspect patients be placed in isolation, which is more
restrictive.212
VII. CONCLUSION
In assessing the battle against SARS in China, it is fair to ask the
following questions. First, could SARS have been better contained?
Second, could the epidemic have been worse? Third, how will the
government react to future public health crises?
SARS could have been better contained. The PTID and its
implementing rules clearly laid out procedures sufficient to handle an
epidemic. However, because the government failed to follow the
preventive measures they prescribed, SARS erupted as a national disaster.
Local governments failed to release accurate information to the public and
to the authorities in neighboring regions. When SARS cases spread to
Beijing, the PTID was again ignored and the results were devastating.
Senior health officials violated the law by covering up SARS information
and misleading the pubic. The health department gave hospitals incorrect
instructions about how to handle the disease, turning hospitals into SARS
spreaders. Had the local and national governments followed the measures
in place, the spread of SARS could have been dramatically reduced. Had
Beijing taken prompt actions as required by the PTID, the cross-infection
rate would have been significantly reduced and more lives would have
been spared.
On the other hand, the epidemic would have been much worse if the
government had continued its “black-box” approach. After the National
Campaign against SARS was officially launched, the government began to
enforce the PTID and took effective measures to combat the disease. The
“black-box” approach to national emergencies was replaced with an open,
honest, and transparent approach. In May of 2003, the government enacted
two major laws that provided specific guidelines for SARS prevention and
treatment. The government’s ideological shift, combined with legally
supported efforts, proved to be a tremendous success and SARS was
effectively brought under control at the end of June 2003.
211. PTID, art. 24(3).
212. PTID (revised), art. 39(2).

118

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 4:81

SARS will likely return.213 The disease is extremely destructive, though
it is not the only disease that poses a constant threat to China’s weak
health care system. SARS has increased public awareness of how
destructive fatal diseases can be. In June of 2004, the government openly
admitted that around 840,000 people are HIV-positive in China.214 In
addition, an estimated 843,000 people are infected with Schistosomiasis, a
disease supposedly controlled decades ago.215 Other diseases, such as
tuberculosis, pose just as serious of a health risk as SARS. It will be an
arduous task for the government to keep a close check on all these
infectious diseases.
The most effective means of combating infectious diseases, especially
those without sure cures or vaccines, is to control the disease in the first
place. Consequently, the government should give top priority to
prevention, including providing rapid means of response, timely
information disclosure and adequate training of medical personnel. The
recent sweeping changes to the PTID reiterate the “prevention first”
principle and demonstrate the government’s determination to incorporate
infectious disease control into its primary agenda. However, the
effectiveness of the new PTID remains to be seen.
Local officials are not accountable to their constituencies because they
are appointed by higher-level government officials. Therefore, the
fundamental criteria for reappointment or promotion is how well one can
implement orders from a higher level, not how well one serves the local
community. In recent years, local gross domestic product (GDP) was the
foremost standard set by the Central Government for assessing local
officials.216 Accordingly, local governments’ sole emphasis was economic
growth. Public health was ignored, largely because it appeared to put a
drain on the local economy.
213. See U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Conference Transcript, Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome Preparation (Sept. 26, 2003), at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/transcripts/
t030926.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2004). “[A]s an infectious disease expert, . . . I’ve never seen a
pathogen emerge and go away on its own,” said Dr. Julie Gerberding, director of the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. [W]e have to expect that somewhere, some time, this
corona virus is going to rear its ugly head again and that’s the whole purpose of all this preparedness
effort.” Id.
214. Zhou He, Woguo aizibing bingren yue 8 wan li, bingdu ganran zhe yue 84 wan ren [China
has 80,000 AIDS Patients and 840,000 People Tested HIV-Positive], PEOPLE NET, June 29, 2003, at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1027/2605049.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2004).
215. Woguo you xuexichongbing bingren 84.3 wan [China has 843,000 People Infected with
Schistosomiasis], XINHUA WANG, June 29, 2004, at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/kuaixun/
598212.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
216. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 439 (2003).
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When SARS first broke out, local governments reacted by assessing
how the disease would affect the image of the local region and hurt the
local economy. During an important news conference, Guangdong health
officials stated that 305 SARS cases were “not too many.”217 As a result,
local governments did not consider it necessary to release valuable
information to the public. The value that local government placed on
health and welfare was less than that placed on local image and economic
growth. If the main focus for appointment and promotion to public office
remains the same, the prevention-first principle will once again fall by the
wayside.
Even though the new draft law has been hailed as a breakthrough in
disease prevention, it remains to be seen whether the law will be
effectively implemented. To comply with the new law, the governments at
both the central and local levels will have to invest substantial financial
and human resources to set up a framework for infectious disease
prevention and treatment. This also means that epidemic prevention will
be a continuing effort, even when no epidemic outbreak seems imminent.
The government must set aside a considerable part of state revenue to
establish and maintain a national epidemic prevention system, revenue that
would otherwise be used to pursue greater economic growth. Unless
government officials have the political will to sacrifice economic growth
for social welfare, the new PTID measures will have no greater effect than
those of the original PTID.
217. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

